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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
Pending before the Court is Defendant Thomas Retzlaff’s Second Amended TCPA Motion 
to Dismiss (Dkt. #44), Defendant’s Notice of Approaching TCPA Deadlines and Request for 
Hearing (Dkt. #59), Defendant’s First Amended Notice of Approaching TCPA Deadlines and 
Motion to Set Hearing (Dkt. #67), and Joint Motion for Clarifying Order (Dkt. #55).  After 
reviewing the relevant pleadings and motions, the Court finds that all the motions should be denied. 
BACKGROUND 
 On March 28, 2018, Plaintiff Jason Lee Van Dyke filed suit against Defendant in the 431st 
State District Court of Texas.  On April 10, 2018, Defendant removed the case to federal court.  
The basis of Plaintiff’s claims revolve around numerous allegedly harassing, false, and defamatory 
statements and publications made by Defendant about Plaintiff.  On April 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed 
his Second Amended Complaint asserting claims for libel per se, intrusion on seclusion, and 
tortious interference with an existing contract (Dkt. #7).  On April 10, 2018, Defendant filed a 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”) (Dkt. #5), which 
the Court denied as moot pursuant to Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Dkt. #53).  As a result, on 
May 22, 2018, Defendant filed his Second Amended TCPA Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #44).  On 
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May 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed his response (Dkt. #48).  On June 11, 2018, the parties filed a Joint 
Motion for Clarifying Order (Dkt. #55).  Specifically, the parties request clarification as to whether 
discovery is stayed in this case as a result of Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  On July 3, 2018, 
Defendant filed a Notice of Approaching TCPA Deadlines and Request for Hearing (Dkt. #59).  
On July 20, 2018, Defendant filed a First Amended Notice of Approaching TCPA Deadlines and 
Motion to Set Hearing (Dkt. #67).  The Court first addresses whether the TCPA applies in federal 
court, then discusses the requests for a hearing and clarification.   
ANALYSIS 
The TCPA is an anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation”) statute 
that is designed to “encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak 
freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted 
by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for 
demonstrable injury.”  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002.  “To achieve this, the TCPA 
provides a means for a defendant, early in the lawsuit, to seek dismissal of certain claims in the 
lawsuit.”  NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2014).   
Filing a motion to dismiss under the TCPA “stops discovery in the action until the court 
has ruled, save for limited discovery relevant to the motion.”  Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 707 
(5th Cir. 2016) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.003(c), 27.006(b) (West 2011)).  
Moreover, the statute provides an accelerated timetable for addressing such a motion: “[t]he court 
must set a hearing on the motion within 60 days of service (90 or 120 days in certain exceptional 
cases involving crowded dockets, good cause, or TCPA-related discovery) . . . and the court must 
rule on the motion within 30 days after the hearing.”  Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 27.004, 27.005 (West 2011)).  If a court fails to abide by such deadlines, the motion is 
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deemed denied by operation of law and the defendants may appeal.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE § 27.008(a).   
Defendant avers that the TCPA not only applies in federal court but also requires that the 
Court dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims (Dkt. #44 at pp. 3; 26).  Federal courts sitting in diversity1 
apply state substantive law rather than federal common law.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 78 (1938).  Stated differently, federal courts apply state common law but federal procedural 
rules.  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Foradori v. Harris, 523 
F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 2008).  Performing an Erie analysis involves a multi-step inquiry.  First, 
the Court must determine whether the statute is procedural or substantive.  State procedural statutes 
are not applied in federal courts.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  Second, the Court determines whether the 
state substantive law conflicts with federal procedural rules; if so, then the federal rule applies.  All 
Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2011).  
The Fifth Circuit has yet to address whether the TCPA is procedural or substantive, or 
whether it applies in federal court.  See Diamond Consortium, Inc. v. Hammervold, No. 17-40582, 
2018 WL 2077910, at *3 n.3 (5th Cir. May 3, 2018) (“we follow previous panels in assuming 
without deciding that Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court.”); Block v. Tanenhaus, 
867 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[t]he applicability of state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court 
is an important and unresolved issue in this circuit.”); Cuba, 814 F.3d at 706 (“we first review the 
TCPA framework, which we assume—without deciding—controls as the state substantive law in 
these diversity suits.”); Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 631 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[w]e have not 
specifically held that the TCPA applies in federal court; at most we have assumed without deciding 
its applicability.”).  Although the Fifth Circuit has assumed that the TCPA is a controlling state 
                                                 
1 Here, the Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.  See (Dkt. #7 at ¶ 2.1).   
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substantive statute, Cuba, 814 F.3d at 706, the Court finds persuasive the dissent in Cuba.  
Specifically, United States Circuit Judge James E. Graves in his dissent found that  
the TCPA is procedural and must be ignored.  The TCPA is codified in the Texas 
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, provides for a pre-trial motion to dismiss claims 
subject to its coverage, establishes time limits for consideration of such motions to 
dismiss, grants a right to appeal a denial of the motion, and authorizes the award of 
attorneys’ fees if a claim is dismissed.  This creates no substantive rule of Texas 
law; rather, the TCPA is clearly a procedural mechanism for speedy dismissal of a 
meritless lawsuit that infringes on certain constitutional protections.  Because the 
TCPA is procedural, I would follow Erie’s command and apply the federal rules. 
 
Cuba, 814 F.3d at 720 (citations omitted).  The dissent continued to explain that even if the TCPA 
were substantive, it is inapplicable in federal court because it conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12 and 56.  Id. at 719–720.  As such, the dissent concluded that  
the TCPA is procedural and we may not apply it when sitting in diversity.  Even if, 
however, it could be said that the TCPA is substantive, then there is no doubt that 
it must yield to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it directly conflicts 
with the pre-trial dismissal mechanisms of Rules 12 and 56. 
 
Id. at 721. 
Agreeing with the dissent in Cuba, United States Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin in 
the Western District of Texas denied a motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA.  Rudkin v. Roger 
Beasley Imports, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-849, 2017 WL 6622561, at *1–*3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2017), 
report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2122896.2  Specifically, Magistrate Judge Austin 
found that  
the TCPA contains procedural provisions setting forth deadlines to seek dismissal, 
deadlines to respond, and even deadlines for the court to rule, as well as appellate 
rights, and the recovery of attorney’s fees.  It is a procedural statute and thus not 
applicable in federal court.  Even if the statute is viewed to be somehow substantive, 
it still cannot be applied in federal court, as its provisions conflict with Rules 12 
and 56, rules well within Congress’s rulemaking authority. 
 
Id. at *3.   
                                                 
2 The Court notes that although Rudkin is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, a ruling has not yet been issued.   
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 Adopting the reasoning of the dissent in Cuba and the District Court in the Western District 
of Texas, the Court finds that the TCPA, regardless if classified as procedural or substantive, does 
not apply in federal court.  Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss should 
be denied.  Consequently, the Court further finds that Defendant’s requests for a hearing on his 
motion to dismiss should be denied as moot.  Finally, the Court clarifies that discovery is not stayed 
in this case.  Instead, the deadlines as set out in the Court’s Scheduling Order (Dkt. #54) are to 
remain in effect.   
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s Second Amended TCPA Motion to Dismiss 
(Dkt. #44) is hereby DENIED.  It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s Notice of Approaching 
TCPA Deadlines and Request for Hearing (Dkt. #59) and First Amended Notice of Approaching 
TCPA Deadlines and Motion to Set Hearing (Dkt. #67) are hereby DENIED as moot.  Regarding 
the parties’ Joint Motion for Clarifying Order (Dkt. #55), the parties are ORDERED to abide by 
the deadlines as set out in the Court’s Scheduling Order (Dkt. #54).   
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